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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ItO\'" J ~-\~IES BARNHILL,
dba ZIOXS :F,URNI'fl~RE
lTI> HOLS'l'ERING,
Plaintiff-..:1 p Jlclla nt,

vs.

lTOlrXG

No.
9591

SIGN
(~0)11> .t\NY, a corporation,
ELE(~'l'lllC

Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

ST..:\'fE)Il~~X'l'

OF

~rHE

J(IND OF CASE

'fhis is an action for datnages to the plaintiff's
business and goods eaused by the negligence of the
defendant in the operation and repair of an electric sign
over the building occupied by the plaintiff.
1
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DISPOSI,-fiON IN LO,VER COURT
'fhe case 'vas tried to a jury. From a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, taking the case fron1
the jury, plaintiff appeals.
RELIE~~

SOUG-HT OX APPEAL

Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judgrnent in his favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a
new trial.

Plaintiff operated the Zions Furniture lTpholstering business at a place kno,vn as Parkin Junction,
across the road from Slin1 Olson's Service Station in
Bountiful, Ctah. in a building· over "·hich the defendant
operated and rnaintained a large neon and electric sign.
In the early n1orning of October 30th, 1959, during a
high wind, the building, including the business and
goods of the plaintiff, was completely destroyed by
fire. The fire started on the roof of the building in the
vicinity of the sign. .~. \ disturbance ""as observed in the
sign at the tin1e a fire ""as seen on the roof of the building
and before the fire had reached the inside of the building. 'fhe electric and neon sign "·as cornpletely within
the control of the defendant, "\vhose workmen were on
the roof of the building late the night before the fire,
rnoving and repairing· parts of the sign. Each side of
the sign 'vas fed b~,. 110 Yolts of electricity, which was
2
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boosted by transforiners to a voltage as high as 16,000.
})art of the sig·n \Vas dangling fro1n electric wires at a
place \\·here the roof would have been. The plaintiff
suffered da1nages iu the sum of approximately $25,500
as a result of the fire.

ARGUnlEN'l.,
Point 1. 'l,he case should have gone to the jury on
the doctrine of Res Ipsa I~oquitur.
'fhe neon and electric sign was an object of instruIneutality wholly within the control of the defendant.
(R. 16. 93 and 102). ~Joore vs. J a1nes, 5 U 2nd 91~
297

P

~nd ~~1.

'l.,he fire started on the roof of the building in the
vicinity of the sig·n. ~lr. lVIendenhall ( R. 33) a driver
for the Greyhound Bus, drove past the building going
north shortly before the building \Vas consumed and
sa"· no fire on the inside of the building. He could not
haYe seen a fire of the size described by Mr. Gayhart
(R. 51) on the roof of the building because of the fire\vall and the slope of the roof. )lr. Gayhart, on the other
hand, driving a Greyhound bus to"\vard the south, was
able to and did see a fire on the roof of the building
shortly before the building "\vas enYeloped in fla1nes,
sho,ving that it \Yas 1nore probable that the fire was
caused by the sign than from the inside of the building.
,,. . ightn1an Y. i\Iountain Fuel Supply Company, 5 Utah
~nd

373, 302 P ~nd 471.
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Point 2. The trial court erred in refusing to subn1it
the case to the jury on the question of Circumstantial
Evidence.
There had been other severe winds in the vicinity
of the building before the 30th of October, 1959, and
during the time that the defendant had been maintaining
its sign on the building (It. 16). 'l~he windows of the
building had been blown out three different times and
the defendant knew or 'vith the exercise of ordinary
care should have known of the probability of such
storms.
The transformers in the defendant's sign boosted
the po,ver from 110 to 16,000 volts and created an instrumentality capable of starting the fire (R. 29).
'fhere 'vere agents of the defendant's working on
the sign the day and night before the fire, repairing
changing or adjusting the sign ( R. 19) .
The fire actually started on the roof of the building
and there was a disturbance in the sign (R. 55).
'!~here

was a part of the sign hanging by \vhat appeared to be electric 'vires the n1orning after the fire,
'vhich would have rested on the roof had there been a
roof there ( R. 22 and 95) .
I~rom JA~fES

, ... ROBERTSON, 39 U. 414,

119 P. 1068:

"A plaintiff suing for neg·ligence need merely
sho'v a state of facts fron1 which the jury n1ay
logically infer negligence, and, "rhere the jury
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believes plaintiff's eYidence fro1n \vhich the inference of negligence Inay be deducted, the evidence
ordinarily sustains a finding of negligence,
though defendant disputes all of plaintiff's evi,'
<l ence.
}_,roin

S'rO('l\:

BlTSSE \'".

CO~IP.l\.N1.,..,

~IURRA1,..

MEA'l, & LIVE-

45 Utah 596:

''X o case should be taken from the jury unless
it appears, as a matter of la,v, that no recovery
can be had upon any view which c~n reasonably
be dra,vn fron1 the facts 'vhich the evidence tends
to establish. (Cain v. Gold ~fountain Mining
Co., 71 Pac. (Mont.) 1004.) To hold otherwise
'votild be to deprive a litigant of the right of
trial by jury. (Nyback v. Lumber Co., 90 Fed.,
776.}

and further from BUSSE\-... MURRAY MEAT &
LI\_,.E STOCK CO., 45 utah 596:
"''I'rue, negligence as well as how the accident
occurred nuty be inferred from known or established facts and circumstances. Such inference
must, ho,veve,r, be based upon some known or
established fact or facts and cannot be conjectured or inferred from other inferences. In failing to sho'v negligence, we think this case comes
squarely "~ithin the principle 'vhich controlled
the case of Quinn v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 42
lTtah 113; 129 Pac. 362; 43 L.R.A. (N.S.)
328. See, also 3 Elliott on Evidence, Section
:2503 .

.. . . . 'I'he controlling question, therefore, is
"·hat 'vere plaintiffs required to prove in order
to n1ake out a prima facie case for the jury?

5
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"'l"'he "Triter is not a'vare of any better statement of the law in that regard than is contained
in 1 Shear. & Redf. Neg. (Sixth ed.) section
58, 'vhere the author states the rule in the follo,ving language:
"The plaintiff is not bound to prove more
than enough to raise a fair presumption of
negligence on the part of the defendant and
of resulting injury to himself. Having done
this, he is entitled to recover, unless the defendant produces evidence sufficient to rebut
this presumption. It has sometimes been held
not sufficient for the plaintiff to establish a
probability of the defendant's fault, but this
is going too far. If the facts proved make it
probable that the defendant violated his duty,
it is for the jury to decide "~hether he did so or
not. To hold otherwise would be to deny the
value of circumstantial evidence. As already
stated, the plaintiff is not bound to prove his
case beyond a reasonable doubt; and, although
the facts sho"rn must be 1nore consistent with
the negligence of the defendant than with the
absence of it~ they need not be inconsistent with
any other hypothesis. It is well settled that
evidence of negligence need not be direct and
positive. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient.
In the nature of the case, the plaintiff must
labor under difficulties in proving the fact of
negligence; and as that fact itself is a},yays
a relative one. it is susceptible of proof by
evidence of circumstances bearing more or less
directly upon the fact of negligence; and as
that fact itself is al,Yars a relative one. it is
susceptible of proof by evidence of circtunstances bearing more or less directly upon the
fact of negligence.. a kind of evidence which

6
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tnight not be satisfactory in other classes of
cases open to clearer proof. 'l.,his is on the
general principle of the law of evidence which
holds that to be sufficient or satisfactory evidence "·hich satisfies an unprejudiced mind."
~-.1\

e:treful reading of the foregoing statement
of the la"· "·hich emanates from two of the ablest,
as '"ell as the 1nost careful text-writers upon the
subject, 'vill, \\'e think, convince anyone that the
facts and circu1nstances of this case are not such
that a court 'vould be justified to declare as
matter of la"' that there is no substantial evidence
upon which a jury could base a finding of negligence on the part of the defendant in laying the
t"·o tracks so close together.
".r\.t most, the question of negligence may be
said to be doubtful; and, where such is the case,
it has becon1e elementary in this jurisdiction, as
well as in many others, that the question is for
the jury. ,Johnson Y. Silver King Consol. Mining Co. of Utah, 54 Utah 34.
n

And from :\IORBY
252

,r. ROGERS,

122 U. 540,

Pi 281, 1953:
''}1-.,ather for death of 13 year old son, only
eYidence hr defen.dant's drivers of the car. Boy
on bike. "l t is not new or novel principle that
acts of negligence may be proved by circumstances. Certainly, in many cases, particularly
"·here the only eye witnesses are parties having
an interest in the action, such circumstances are
the only means by 'vhich certain facts may be
discovered. In such cases it is proper that such
circumstances should be evaluated by the jury
in 'vhose province lies th~ power to believe or
disbelieve the testimony and evidence, to observ-e
7
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the demeanor of the witnesses, and then dra'v
such reasonable conclusions from the whole record as may be warranted. '~We are of the opinion
that reasonable minds could find negligence on
the part of the defendant from the evidence in
the record. 'l.,he trial court did not err in letting
the question of defendant's negligence go to the
jury under the evidence."
l~ro1n

CORPL'S JURIS

SJ~CONDCni,

P. 243,

-Page 1100:
"Direct or positive negligence is not necessary
but defendant's negJ.igence may be established
by circumstantial evidence and by proof of facts
fron1 which negligence may reasonably be inferred . . . '' That no other conclusion. can be
fairly or reasonably drawn from them" seems to
be the test.''
and A)I JUR., 38, 993, Paragraph 297:
"Rejection of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
does not mean that negligence may not be established by circumstantial eYidence as well as by
direct evidence.''
Respectfully submitted,

IIORAl'1.E J. KNO''rLTOX
Attorney for Appellants
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